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Imagine the following: a small militant religious group led by the
Reverend Goeree publishes ajournal entitled Evan. An article in the
journal's most recent edition attacks homosexuals under the banner
headline "Sodom is Everywhere." Reverend Goeree reprints the
article in pamphlets and distributes it widely throughout the country.
Included in the article are the following statements:
Now that homosexuality has been legalized, the new death appears.
It is the result of sin: AIDS!
A consequence of homosexuality is AIDS which, without possibility
of appeal, brings about death.
Being a lesbian is rewarded. AIDS passes by the door of lesbian
women. At the moment, anyway. Ten years ago, the homosexuals
were rewarded like this.
They didn't have AIDS. God lets no-one (sic) ridicule him.
Those who practice homosexuality incurs a blood-guilt comparable
to a murderer. He deserves the death penalty.
Homosexuality leads irrevocably to damnation. Legalization of
homosexuality is the product of a reprehensible government
leading the country into ruin.
Fred, a gay man, is distressed after reading one of Reverend
Goeree's pamphlets. As head nurse at a local hospital, Fred is
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constantly confronted with AIDS-related deaths. Although he does
not have AIDS, he fears that readers of the pamphlet will accuse him
of being responsible for its existence and transmission. Fred knows
that Goeree's message is untrue. Nevertheless, it is insulting,
derogatory, and injurious. The words encourage hatred of, and
discrimination against, homosexuals. Consequently, Fred believes that
Reverend Goeree should be made to stop publishing the pamphlets
and be prohibited from the future publication of untruthful and
unnecessarily offensive views concerning homosexuals. In particular,
Fred wants the Reverend to stop claiming that homosexuals are
responsible for AIDS and to formally apologize in the major national
newspapers. Fred thinks that the Reverend should pay him $1,200 for
each day that a correction is not published, and a lump sum payment
of $25,000 for telling lies about AIDS and causing him emotional
harm. As a member of an oppressed minority, Fred feels that he
should not have to be the victim of verbal terror. He believes that
freedom of speech should not include the freedom to harass and
propagate discriminatory hatred.
Does Fred have a legal remedy for the actions of the Reverend
Goeree? Can he sue Goeree for emotional distress or for defamation,
or are Goeree's words protected as religious speech? Can an appeal
be made to international treaty rights? The answers to these
questions may be dependant upon where Goeree passes out the
pamphlets and where Fred lives.
The facts regarding Fred are real and form the basis of an
important Dutch Supreme Court decision involving hate speech
against gays and lesbians. One purpose of this article is to compare
Dutch and American legal approaches to such issues. Therefore, the
first section will explore freedom of speech from both countries'
perspectives. In order to give Fred's narrative contextual meaning,
section two will describe the cultural and political milieu in which
Fred exists and compare it to its American counterpart. The last
section will offer possible new legal arguments against hate speech
based on Dutch law. The purpose of this article is to provide
American lesbians and gays with legal ammunition to combat
harassing speech that frequently causes severe emotional distress and
discrimination, and defames the lesbian and gay community.
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I. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
A. The Dutch Approach
In the Netherlands, Frederick Van Zijl ("Fred") was able to bring
suit against Reverend Goeree and subsequently received relief. In Van
Zijl v. Goeree,1 the Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court), issued an
injunction against the further publication of Goeree's article, which
harassed and degraded gays and lesbians. Further, he was fined 5,000
Dutch guilders for every time a part of the article appeared in print
after the date of the decision.2
Reverend Goeree's article, "Sodom is the Netherlands," was
distributed throughout the country.8 The article included warnings
that lesbians, as well as gays, would be punished by God with AIDS,
and that the practice of homosexuality warranted the death penalty.'
As indicated, Fred, a gay nurse who cared for AIDS patients, was
personally distressed by the article. Although not a direct target of
the hate filled messages, Fred feared that others would hold him
responsible for the existence and transmission of AIDS.'
Fred argued before the Zwolle County Court of Summary Proceed-
ings that the articles were insulting, derogatory and distressing.' He
asserted that the words used were unnecessarily wounding and that
they propagated and encouraged hatred of and discrimination against
1. 1990 RvdW Nr.41 (HR Neth) (highest Netherlands court) (drs. Alan Reeve, trans.)
[translation on file withjournal] (finding no new interpretation of what constitutes freedom of
religion). The Dutch Supreme Court several years before decided a case that involved the same
defendants, the Goerees. Goeree v. Centrum voor Informatie en Documentatie Israel, 1987 NJ
1988 Nr.702 (HR Neth). In that case, the Goerees had published an article in Evan
accompanied with photographs of prisoners in internment camps. The Goerees had maintained
that the Holocaust was deserved because Jews were "Christ Killers." Their conclusion was that
the death of'Jews was inevitable; that they had brought on their own destruction. The Goerees
believed that the Jews could have saved themselves by accepting Jesus as a Savior, but their
failure to do so caused their death.
Similar to Van Zij4 the Dutch Court in Goeree observed that the Goerees were guaranteed
freedom of religion, but that freedom was limited by responsibilities the Goerees owed to others.
A Dutch lawyer, Den Boer, observed that the Supreme Court was clearly following the Revised
1983 Constitution. Freedom of religious speech does not provide people, such as the Goerees,
the license to commit crimes. Since it is illegal to discriminate according to the Dutch
Constitution, then the Goerees could not, in the name of religion, publish materials that would
encourage others to hate and discriminate against Jews. Thus, the Court came to the same
conclusions as it did in Van Zj/ and the anti-homosexual message of the Goerees. 1987 NJ 1988
Nr.702 (HR Neth).
2. Van Zijl v. Goeree, 1990 RvdW Nr.41 (HR Neth). The facts considered by the Hoge
Raad and the lower courts are those proposed at the beginning of this article.
3. Van Zijl v. Goeree, 1987 NJCM Nr.101 at 317 (Neth Court of Summary Proceedings).
4. Id,
5. Id.
6. Id. at 305.
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homosexuals.7 Goeree, on the other hand, argued that words he
used regarding homosexuals and AIDS were based on his interpreta-
tion of the Bible. Any injunction to stop him from publishing this
material, he insisted, would violate his Constitutional right of
Freedom of Religion.8
In spite of Goeree's defense based on freedom of religious speech,
Fred prevailed because Dutch equal protection analysis forbids
discrimination "on any grounds whatsoever."9  This phrase is
specifically designed to protect homosexuals and other groups.'0
Dutch law makes it clear that non-discriminatory principles apply to
the private, as well as, the public sector, which is distinct from the
laws of most European countries where non-discriminatory principles
apply only to the government."
With approval by the Court of Appeals, the County Court Judge
noted that all people have a constitutional right to freely express their
religious beliefs.12 Naturally, this freedom includes the right to
7. Van Zgjl v. Goeree, 1987 NJCM Nr.101 at 305 (Neth).
8. Id. at 305.
9. GRW. NED. ar. 1 (Neth) (Netherlands Constitution). All persons in the Netherlands
shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Id. Discrimination on the grounds of religious
belief, political opinion, race or sex, or on any other grounds whatsoever, shall not be
permitted. I&
10. ASTRID MATrIJSSEN EN MARTIN MOERINGS, WET GELIJKE BEHANDELING IN PERSPEKTIEF
at 11 (Publicatiereeks Homostudies Utrecht, dl. 15 (1983)). During Parliamentary consider-
ation of the constitutional revision, the first draft only covered discrimination as it related to
religious belief, political opinion, race, or sex. The debate concerning these categories focused
on extending the provision to prevent discrimination based on sexual orientation. At that
juncture, the draft was reworded to protect all from discrimination and the revised Dutch
Constitution took effect in 1983. Kees Waaldijk, The Legal Situation in the Member States, in
HOMOSEXUALrIY: A EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY ISSUE 77-78 (K. Waaldik & A. Clampham eds., 1993).
See also A. Mattijssen, We Niet Waagt Die Niet Wnt, in HOMOSEYSUALrTEIT EN RECHT1, 14-15 (M.
Moerings & A. Mattijssen eds., 1992).
11. Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 10 December 1987 14 NJCM bulletin 305, 315 (1989);
Mattijssen, supra note 10, at 14-15; see, e.g., Germany, SCH-VULE IN RECHT, 314 (1992); Kees
Waaldijk, The Legal Situation in the Member States, in HOMOSEXUALriy: A EUROPEAN CONINUNITv
ISSUE (IL Waaldijk & A. Clampham eds., 1993).
12. GRiy. NED. art. 6, sub. 1 (Neth). Every person, individually and in community with
others, has the right to freedom of religion or philosophical belief, practice and propagation
except "ieders verantwoordeljkheid voor de wet" (each person's responsibility before the law).
I&s See also The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR), Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9 (1) EUROP. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER (Burns H. Weston, Richard A. Falk, & Anthony
D'Amato eds., 1990) [hereinafter ECHR]. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. ECHR, supra, art. 9(1).
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for
the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others. ECHR, supra, art. 9(2).
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publish these beliefs. This right, however, is not absolute.13 The
Dutch Constitution recognizes the tension that can exist between
preserving the right of free speech and ensuring that all citizens
receive the equal protection of the law. In Goeree, the Hoge Raad
held that the harm caused to the plaintiff by the widespread
distribution of untruthful, anti-gay propaganda diminished the
plaintiff's position in society and, therefore, his right to equal
treatment. 4 Based on this rationale, the Court held that the
Plaintiff's right to equal treatment outweighed the evangelical's right
to freely express his religious beliefs. 5
B. Freedom of Speech - U.S. Style
Unlike the Netherlands, freedom of speech and equal treatment
under the law are treated as separate rights in the United States.16
The interpretation of these rights is essentially that all laws must be
drafted to treat people equally, and freedom of speech preserves to
all people the freedom to express their beliefs, within certain
limitations. United States lawmakers and courts do not recognize any
connection between these two rights except under Title VIIY
13. GRiW. NED. art. 6, sub. 1 (Neth). "Behoudens ieders verantwoordelijkheid voor de wet"
(each person's responsibility before the law).
14. Van Zijl v. Goeree, 1990 RvdW Nr.41 (HR Neth).
15. Id.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I and amend. XIV, §1.
17. SeeHarrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (holding that conduct need not
"seriously affect an employee's psychological well-being" or lead the plaintiff to "suffer injury"
to be actionable as a hostile or abusive environment for purposes of Title VII). The hostile
environment in this case included statements by a male boss toward a female in the presence
of other employees, such as: "[y]ou're a woman, what do you know," "we need a man as the
rental manager," "[you are] a dumb ass woman", "what did you promise the guy... some [sex]
Saturday night?" and "[why don't we] go to Holiday Inn to negotiate [your] raise?" Id. at 369.
The Court noted that as long as the environment would reasonably be perceived as hostile or
abusive, there was no need for it to also be psychologically injurious. Id. at 371. Whether an
environment is "hostile" or "abusive" is determined by looking at all the circumstances. Id.
The Court listed the following as potential factors to be considered: the frequency of the
conduct, its severity, whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere
offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee's work
performance. Id. at 369. Psychological harm may also be a relevant factor, but is not decisive.
Id.
See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First
Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 481 (1991) (arguing that all speech in the workplace has inherent
free speech value and should be protected. When workplace speech is restricted because it may
discriminate or be offensive to a protected group, it results in the suppression of even protected
speech.);Jennifer L Conn, Sexual Harassment: A Thirteenth Amendment Response. 28 COLUM.J.L.
& Soc. PRoBS. 519 (1995) (discussing how the Thirteenth Amendment could be used as a means
to regulate sexually harassing speech in the workplace as harassment which subjugates its victims.
The author draws parallels between women and blacks and sees sexual harassment as a "badge
of slavery." This would give the government constitutional authority to act against work place
harassment and harmful speech in a specific context); Richard H. Fallon,Jr, Sexual Harassment,
Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn't Bite, 1994 SUp. Gr. REv. 1 (stating that
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW [Vol. 4:303
Content-based speech enjoys the highest protection possible under
the First Amendment."8 The legal deference given to free speech
stems from the United States' historical origins and is perpetuated by
the American fixation with individual rights and freedoms. American
youth are taught that they are free to criticize their government, free
to form their own opinions, and free to practice the religion of their
choice. This, they are told, is the beauty of the democracy into which
they are born.
On a conceptual level, freedom of speech allows all people to
participate in the political process. Without fear of official retribu-
tion, an American can criticize the government and public leaders.
She is free to express her religious faith and her social values. In
theory, all Americans have access to "the marketplace of ideas," and
it is believed that through their free exchange, "truth" will prevail."
the doctrine of restricting workplace speech could be intenvoven into existing First Amendment
limits. Speech that is intended to offend, directed at a specific target, stigmatizes because of
gender, and which foreseeably interferes with the workplace, should be regulated. This specific
type of limitation of workplace speech fits easily within the limits that the Court has already
placed on other types of speech.); George Rutherglen, Sexual Harassment: Ideology or Law?., 18
HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL' 487-88 (1995) (arguing that because of the fluidity of gender roles, only
the most offensive forms of speech should be restricted. If harassment actions are limited to
severe and pervasive types of discriminatory speech then most First Amendment concerns can
be avoided. The courts should impose a reasonable woman standard for determining what is
severe and pervasive.); Keith R. Fentonmiller, Note, Verbal SexualHarassment as Equality Depriving
Conduct, 27 U. MICm. J.L. REF. 565-69 (1994) (discussing how sexual harassment is more than
pure speech-it is conduct that deprives the individual of equality. In a workplace context this
equality depriving conduct needs to be understood in the historical context of how women have
been treated. Sexual harassment in the workplace, by definition, defines women as inferior, and
as not belonging in there. Regulation of sexually harassing speech in the workplace is
Constitutional. Using the balancing test, the author weighs the interests of free speech against
equality interests); James H. Fowles, III, Note, Hostile Environment and the First Amendment: What
Now After Harris and St. Paul?, 46 S.C. L. REv. 471 (1995) (discussing the Supreme Court's
analysis of hostile environment as discrimination and how this analysis offers no standard for
analyzing First Amendment concerns. The author looks at Harris v. Forklift, 114 S. Ct. 367
(1993) [merely offensive], United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) [expressive conduct],
and R.AV. Petitioner v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) [content-based] to analyze how the
Court might limit or extend freedom of speech protections.).
18. SeeTurner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 2445,
2478 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that to justify
content-based speech, "[t] here must be some pressing public necessity, some essential value that
must be preserved. . ."); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding that content-based speech
restrictions are generally unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored to a compelling state
interest); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 462 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1972) (finding that "the
government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but
deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views").
19. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 786 (2d ed. 1988)
(citingAbramns v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J., concurring):
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
free market and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes can be safely
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Even in American society, however, freedom of speech is not
absolute. Some speech is considered of such low value that it does
not receive protection from the First Amendment and the govern-
ment may regulate this speech in the interest of public safety and
quality of life.2" Contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence
allows content-based restrictions of speech when the speech qualifies
as obscenity, "fighting words" or represents "a clear and present
carried out.
20. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973) (elaborating the obscenity
position by claiming that regulation of obscene materials serves legitimate state interests in
maintaining the quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in
the great city centers, and possibly, the public safety itself); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957) (holding specifically that obscenitywas not within the realm of constitutionally-protected
speech); see alsoJeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REv. 297 (1995)
(analyzing how the Supreme Court applies the concept of "low value" to different genres of
speech. The Court's application is dubious because restrictions on speech are really based on
harm, not value.); Carl F. Stychin, Exploring the Limits: Feminism and the Legal Regulation of Gay
Male Pornography, 16 VT. L. REv. 857-58 (1992) (discussing how feminists erroneously classify gay
male pornography in the same categories as all heterosexual pornography. In this vein,
feminism is guilty of a pure gender analysis that may not necessarily apply here. Gay male
pornography as gay male culture has a history of being suppressed and censored; therefore, it
is really more akin to political expression than sexual expression); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography
and the First Amendmen4 1986 DUKE LJ. 589 (1986) (arguing that pornography is a social
problem that is of significant legal concern and as compared with other types of speech that
invoke First Amendment protection, it is of "low value" and not entitled to full protection);
Nicholas Wolfson, Eroticism, Obscenity, Pornography and Free Speech, 60 BROO. L. REv. 1037 (1994)
(arguing that the Court must limit free speech in the context of pornography because society
finds it fundamentally dangerous and offensive).
See generally Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography and Equality, 8
HARV. WOMEN'S Lj. 1 (1985) (discussing the Feminist view as espoused by MacKinnon and
Dworkin, finding that pornography is a threat to the safety and interests of women and thus to
the community at large); Caryn Jacobs, Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on the Regulation
of Pornography, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 5 (1984) (examining pornography and its use as a tool of
violence and discussing potential methods of regulation); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography,
Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1985) (arguing that pornography is a civil
rights violation); Tamara Packard and Melissa Schraibman, Lesbian Pornography: Escaping the
Bonds of Sexual Stereot)ping and Strengthening Our Ties to One Another, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S Lj. 299
(1994) (citing examples of queer theories);. But seeJames R. Branit, Reconciling Free Speech and
Equality: What Justifes Censorship, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 429 (1986) (arguing that
pornography should have full free speech protection. Pornography can be regulated when it
is conduct that causes harm.); David Cole, Playing by Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual
Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1994) (discussing how the regulation of pornography/sexual
expression is an essential part of the actual construction of sexuality because by making
pornography illegal it increases its appeal and its seductiveness. To eradicate pornography more
speech is needed, not more restraints, to bring it into public discussion and to find positive ways
to affirm the exploration of sex.); Mary C. Dunlap, Sexual Speech and the State: Putting Pornography
in its Place 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 359 (1987) (arguing that pornography has a place in
society and the government should not be allowed to decide the boundaries of our sexual
communications and our private consensual sexual acts. This is especially true in the age of
AIDS, teen pregnancies, and gay/lesbian rights, when the emphasis should be on more
discussion and more openness about sexual issues.).
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danger." Goeree's article "Sodom is Everywhere," however, is none
of these.
II. THE CONTEXT
The temptation of many Americans is to conclude that the Dutch
can support homosexual rights because they are either abnormally
tolerant22 or because they do not respect the value of free speech
and freedom of religion.23 Americans may believe that Dutch
toleration is the result of the country's homogeneity-that the Dutch
have a more developed sense of community because there are fewer
differences. 4 Others may believe that Dutch constitutional rights
are subject to the whims of their Parliament and, consequently, that
the Dutch have an undeveloped frame of reference regarding free
speech because governmental interference is commonplace.25
The Goeree decision, however, cannot be dismissed as a product of
either restrictive attitudes toward speech, or a society which automati-
cally grants protection to lesbians and gays. As with any other legal
rights extended to outsiders, the momentum is frequently started by
core interest groups. After World War I, the Dutch Parliament passed
21. The right to free expression is not absolute. The Court recognizes certain categories
of unprotected speech. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 49 (holding that speech that is obscene
is not protected); Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (stating that certain categories
of unprotected speech include speech or association which present a "clear and present
danger"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (including speech that falls
within the category of "fighting words" as being unprotected speech).
22. Dutch homosexual couples have the same rights as heterosexuals in the areas of rent
protection, income tax, and social security. Rob Tielman & Hans Hammelburg, World Survey on
the Social and Legal Position of Gays and Lesbians, in THE THIRD PINK BOOK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF
LESBIAN AND GAY LIBERATION AND OPPRESSION 249, 308 (Aart Hendriks, Rob Tielman, & Evert
van der Veen eds., 1993). However, Dutch lesbians and gays do not have the same rights as
heterosexuals with regard to pensions, inheritance tax, and adoption rights. Id. Recently,
legislators in the Dutch Parliament proposed that lesbian mothers or gay fathers be allowed to
share parental authority with their same sex partners. Tweede Kamer, 1993-94, 23714, Nrs.1-3.
An additional proposal, which was sent to Parliament, would make registered partnerships
possible. Registered Partnerships would give almost all legal rights and duties concerning
marriage to couples who cannot legally marry. The Registered Partnership would cover not only
gays and lesbians, but sisters, mothers, grandparents or any other two-person relationship. The
proposal does not grant adoption rights or other parental rights. Tweedkamer, supra, at Nrs.
1-3.
23. See GRW. NED. art. 6, sub. 1 (Neth) An odd claim given that the Dutch Constitution
affords freedom of speech and of religion.
24. Netherlands Demographics. Pop. (1992 est.) 15,112,000. Age distribution - (0-14) -
18%; (15-60) - 64.2%; (60+) - 17.0%; NATIONS OF THE WORLD AS OF MID-1993, THE WORLD
ALMANAC BOOK OF FACTS at 793 (Funk and Wagnalls eds., 1993). Ethnic/religious - 432,000
Muslims, 81,000 Hindu or Buddist; Religion - Roman Catholic - 38%; Dutch Reformed - 18% -
Reformed 10% - Others 4% - Non-religious 29%. First Dutch Report to the Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"), at 20 (Nov. 1992).
25. It must be noted that the Dutch Parliament cannot easily change the Dutch
Constitution. It takes two-thirds majority of both chambers to propose and finalize an
amendment to the Constitution. STATUUT NED. art. 137 (Neth).
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legislation that made all homosexual contact illegal.26 As a result of
that legislation, the Dutch Scientific Humanitarian Committee
("NWHK") was organized This group was a forerunner of the
Nederslandse Vereniging tot Integratie van Homosekualiteit COG
(Cultuur-en-ontspannings Centrum), the largest lesbian and gay
organization. The theoretical base of the COC is to spread informa-
tion to key decision makers. This theoretical base is well-suited to the
Dutch scene, where issues are "pillarized." That is, the issues are
formalized and supported by certain groups.28 However, before the
COG could have the same status as other interest groups, the
organization had to apply for association recognition called "Konink-
lijke Goedkeuring" (Royal Permission). COG was in a battle with the
government during the early 1960's and into the 1970's as it attempt-
ed to gain association recognition. Finally, the minister of Internal
Affairs granted their request in 1973. This grant meant that the COC
could act as an official association, with the same legal powers as an
individual to contract.2 9
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the COG combined its
strategy of influencing important people with other friendly organiza-
tions, such as the women's rights groups, the movement for sexual
freedom, and other organizations focusing on the promotion of
human rights. These groups advocated establishing anti-discrimina-
tion legislation in which sex was given a broad definition, including
marital status, parenthood, and sexual orientation."0 As a result of
the status and influence of these groups, changes were made during
the last twenty years concerning the legal status of lesbians and gay
men in the Netherlands.
These successes did not occur, however, without fierce opposition.
In fact, there was an extraordinary vocal resistance from the more
conservative religious political parties and institutions regarding every
small step lesbians and gays made in attaining their legal rights. In
1971, when the criminal statute prohibiting homosexual acts31 was
abolished, a small number of Dutch conservatives were horrified.32
26. PENAL CODE, art. 248-bis (Neth 1911). From 1811 until 1911 homosexual conductwas
legal. ROB TIELMAN, HOMOsExuALTrrErr IN NEDERLAND (1982).
27. TIELMAN, supra note 26, at 76-77.
28. TIELMAN, supra note 26, at 76-77.
29. TIELMAN, supra note 26, at 173-80.
30. Marianne Hoogma, The Netherlands: A Fifteen Year Fight for Equal Rights, in THE SECOND
ILGA PINK BOOK, at 130-31 (1988). An example of such a group is the "Man-Vrouw.
Maatschappi" (Man-Woman Society).
31. PENAL CODE, art. 248-bis (Neth 1911).
32. Roelof Haveman & Martin Moerings, De homogeniteit in het strafrech4 in HOmO-
SENSUALrrErr EN REcHT 1, 39 (M. Moerings & A. Mattijssen eds., 1992).
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Five members of Parliament, influenced by the Evangelical Alliance,
were able to forestall any proposed legislation for more than twenty
years. This was so despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of
the Parliament supported the Labor Party's motion which asked the
Dutch government to pass legislation forbidding discrimination based
on sex, homosexuality and marital status.3  Finally, in 1993, the
Christian Democratic and Labor Party proposed another Equal
Treatment Law which passed and went into effect in September
1994.34
The 1994 Equal Treatment Law grants further protection to the
criminal laws that forbid hatred, discrimination, insult, or violence
directed at lesbians and gays. 5 These equal treatment laws already
existed for racial discrimination; however, after the 1994 Act, it
became discriminatory to abuse people based on their sexual
orientation. Discrimination that hindered a person in his or her work
or profession would also be included." Furthermore, it became
illegal to promote discrimination against people on account of their
sexual orientation. 37  Promotion would include public remarks and
participation in acts of discrimination. Thus, in the Netherlands, not
only is it a crime to discriminate generally, but it is also a crime to
specifically discriminate against gays and lesbians in the employment
context or in the performance of a public office. 8
As in the Netherlands, the gay and lesbian movement in the United
States gathered momentum in the sixties and early seventies.39 The
33. IM.
34. Stb. § 230 1994 (Neth.). The legislation protects against discrimination based on
religious belief, political opinion, race, sex, nationality, sexual orientation, or civil status.
35. PENAL CODE, art. 137c (Neth) ("Anyone who in public, orally or through writing or
illustration, insults a group of persons on account of their race, religion or belief, or sexual
orientation, shall be punished with imprisonment of up to one year or with a fine of the third
category."). PENAL CODE, art. 137d ("Anyone who in public, orally or through writing or
illustration, hatred or discrimination against persons or to violence against the bodies or good
of persons on account of their race, religion or belief, sex or hetero- or homosexual orientation,
shall be punished with imprisonment of up to one year or with a fine of the third category.").
PENAL CODE, art. 137e ("Anyone who takes part or gives financial or other material support to
activities aimed at discrimination against persons because of their race, sex or hetero- or
homosexual orientation, shall be punished with detention of up to six months or a fine of the
third category.").
36. PENAL CODE, art. 137 (Neth).
37. Md
38. ML at art. 429 quarter (Neth). ("Anyone who, in the performance for public office, a
profession of a business, distinguishes between persons on account of their race, sex or hetero-
or homosexual orientation, shall be punished with detention of up to two months or a fine in
the third category."). (10,000 guilders).
39. See generally BARRY D. ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT, 81-124 (rev.
ed. 1995) (relating gay liberation and lesbian feminism); Andrew M. Jacobs, The Rhetorical
Construction of Rights: The Case of the Gay Rights Movement 1969-1991, 72 NEB. L. REv. 723 (1993)
(reviewing the changes in discourse concerning gay rights).
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catalyst was a police raid in 1969 on a New York City bar, the
Stonewall.' One of the methods legal institutions used to harass
homosexuals before the 1970's was to have the police conduct
ritualized raids of gay bars. At the Stonewall, the police attempted
to eject a drag queen crowd and met with resistance.' The resulting
riot and eventual burning of the bar is credited as the turning point
in the current gay liberation movement.4 3
What started as a unified protest movement of lesbians and gays
soon diverged. For men, the emphasis was on sexual freedom,
mirroring the sexual revolution that had taken place for non-gays in
the 1960's.1 To facilitate the gay revolution, gay men focused their
political energy on stopping police harassment of patrons of bath
houses, bars and discos.' Lesbians, on the other hand, were much
more likely to take their cues from the women's movement.4 6 Their
political energy was focused on woman's issues, such as controlling
one's body or even setting up separatist communities organized in a
non-hierarchial manner.47
Much in the same way that the Dutch homosexual rights movement
caused the religious right to become vocal in its opposition, Stonewall
40. ADAM, supra note 39, at 81.
41. ADAM, supra note 39, at 81.
42. ADAM, supra note 39, at 81.
43. ADAt, supranote 39, at81 (describing the events at Stonewall);JOHN D'EMLIO, MAKING
TROUBLE 234 (1992) (chronicling gay activism after Stonewall); Martha Shelley, Gay is Good, in
OUT OF THE CLOSETS: VOICES OF GAY LIBERATION 31 (Karla Jay & Allen Young eds., 1972)
(noting the importance of Stonewall); Jacobs, supra note 39, at 723 (summarizing how the
rhetoric on gay rights has evolved); Symposium, Stonewall at 25, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv, 277
(1993) (describing the radicalization of the gay rights movement after Stonewall).
44. The "Playboy Pathos," with an emphasis on sexual freedom, was an impetus to the
sexual revolution.
The world that he [Hefner] invented for himself and retailed in the pages of Playboy,
was a potent period blend of consumerist and sexual fantasy .... Hefner associated sex
with money and class .... [Playboy] played upon this nexus of sexual desire and social
aspiration.... [Playboy was responsible for] purvey[ing] a.. .lifestyle to suggest a non-
shameful, non-furtitive context iA which it might be consumed.
Zoe Heller, King Rabbit in Retirement in THE INDEPENDENT, May 1, 1994, at 15.
45. ADAii, supra note 39, at 99.
46. See generally INTRODUCTION TO LESBIANISM AND THE WOMEN's MovEMENT (Nancy Myron
& Charlotte Bunch eds., 1975) (explaining the complex dynamic between the feminist and
lesbian movements). This collection of articles from The Furies, a lesbian-feminist collective and
newspaper, explores feminist misconceptions of lesbian-feminists, as "(1)lesbian chauvinists,
(2)into oppressive sex roles, or (3)divisive to the women's movement." Id. at 11.
47. The ideology was toward a "lesbian utopia-a nonviolent, fairly androgynous, often
separatist community struggling for socialjustice and freedom for ourselves and other oppressed
people." Barbara Hart, Pr4'ace to NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN
BATTERING 9, 13 (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986). See generally Leaving the Gay Men Behind, COME OUT!,
Dec. 1970Jan. 1971, reprinted in OUT OF THE CLOSETS: VOICES OF GAY LIBERATION 290-92 (Karla
Jay & Allen Young eds., 1972) (commenting on the non-hierarchical structures of "Radical-
Lesbians" as they broke away from the mainstream Gay Liberation Front).
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gave rise to a conservative backlash.' This growing conservatism
continues. For instance, in the 1992 presidential campaign Pat
Buchanan told an applauding Republican Convention that homosexu-
als were a threat to family values.49
Throughout American history free speech such as Buchanan's has
harmed unpopular minorities. Minorities, due to their unprivileged
status, have fewer resources with which to make their voices heard.
This is especially true for gays and lesbians. Unlike many other
minority groups, gays and lesbians have no distinguishable physical
characteristic. Thus, homosexuals can hide their orientation, and
often do so for fear of losing their jobs, being disowned by their
families, being evicted from their houses, and being ostracized by
their communities."
Hiding their orientation, gays and lesbians are easy targets of hate
speech because they are often silent and invisible. The price of
fighting back-of making their voices heard-is often too dear a price
to pay for becoming a part of the political process. Consequently,
other groups are free to promulgate hatred and spread lies about gays
and lesbians with very little opposition.
The harm that unfettered hate speech causes to homosexuals is
evident in the social and legal status that American gays and lesbians
endure. For example, the United States Supreme Court ruling in
Bowers v. Hardwicke1 is wrought with common homophobic misinfor-
mation and prejudice. In Bowers, Chief Justice Burger premised his
concurring opinion on a "millenia of moral teaching," that sodomy
48. ADAM, supra note 39, at 109-27.
49. "The agenda that Clinton would impose on America... homosexual rights... [t] hat's
not the kind of change America needs. It's not the kind of change America wants. And it is
not the kind of change we can abide in a nation that we still call God's country." Pat Buchanan,
The Election is About Who We Are: Taking Back Our Country, in VrrAL SPEECHEs, Sept. 15, 1992, at
712-13. Buchanan reminded convention delegates that the Democrats let a "militant leader of
the homosexual rights movement... rise at the convention and exult, 'Bill Clinton and Al Gore
represent the most pro-lesbian and pro-gay ticket in history.' And so they do." Id. Buchanan
went on to say that at least George Bush doesn't endorse "the amoral idea" that gay people
should be allowed to marry. Id. at 714. It is not solely the radical right which has trouble with
homosexual groups. In his 1996 presidential campaign, Bob Dole returned $1,000 to the Log
Cabin Republicans, a gay political group. This was done despite the fact that Dole's national
finance chair had solicited the Log Cabin executive director to turn out members for fund-
raising work. Dole was aware of who the "Log Cabin Republicans" were, even to the point of
assuring a member at a fund raiser that he (Dole) was helping to re-authorize the Ryan White
Care Act, which funds AIDS research. Christopher Matthews, Log Cabin Fund-Raising Problems
Raise Questions About Dole, ARIZONA REP., Editorial, Sept. 6, 1995, at B5.
50. Charlene L. Smith, Undo Two: An Essay Regarding Colorado's Anti-Lesbian and Gay
Amendment 2, 32 WASHBuRN L.J. 367, 370-74 (1993).
51. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the Constitution does not protect the fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
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is an "offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape, a heinous act 'the very
mention of which is a disgrace to human nature."'52
The "millenia of moral teaching" to which Chief Justice Burger
referred would be more correctly characterized as a millenia of
misconception and ignorance. In determining that homosexuality
involves acts more heinous than rape, the Court looked to Black-
stone's Commentaries for support.53  In Blackstone's time,
homosexuals were often burnt at the stake or hanged, and rape was
not a crime against a woman, but against her father.54 Relying on
such antiquated rhetoric to decide homosexuals' constitutional rights
is as absurd as relying on the moral teachings of the Spanish
Inquisition to determine the constitutional rights of Jews.
A further example of the power that myth and distortion of truth
holds is the brouhaha caused by President Clinton's attempt to openly
integrate homosexuals into the armed forces. 5 Despite the number
of service people, both gay and straight, who testified that sexual
orientation had no impact on the quality of work performed, many
Senators clung to homophobic prejudice. They felt that homosexuals
pose a threat to troop morale and safety in much the same way that
they felt blacks in the 1940's were a threat.56 Some Senators gave
more credence to the paranoia of enlisted soldiers who did not want
to shower with gays than they did to evidence demonstrating that
closeted gay and lesbian soldiers have historically served this country
with honor.5 7 It seemed not to worry Senators that the government
wastes millions of dollars dismissing fine soldiers from the military,
52. d at 197.
58. TRIBE, supra note 19, § 15-21, at 1426 n.45.
54. "With the adoption of the English common law, this rule [that rape was a crime against
a woman's father] was followed in this country for almost 200 years.... [one justification] was
that the woman was considered to be property of her husband or father. Under this premise,
the early rape laws sought compensation for the husband or father, rather than the victim, for
the damages incurred to the 'property."' Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775, 777 (Wyo. 1987)
(discussing why a husband could not be guilty of a rape committed upon his lawful wife); see also
State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1981) (explaining why three common law justifications for
keeping intact the marital exception in rape laws do not apply in the modem context).
55. For a report on gays in the military, from Clinton's 1992 election campaign promise
through the new policy and recent Supreme Court decisions, see New President Faces Gay-Soldiers
Conflict4 in 49 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 454,454-62 (Jan Austin ed., 1994) [hereinafter New President].
"Ultimately, Clinton settled for a modest revision of the policy under which homosexual conduct
still would be prohibited, but recruits no longer would be asked if they were gay." I& at 454.
56. New President, supra note 55, at 456. Senator Helms stated in a floor speech "[tihis
attempt to remove the military's ban ... is the No. 1 priority of the homosexual political
movement .... They know that the armed forces are the last bastion of traditional morality in
this country." IL
57. New President, supra note 55, at 456.
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regardless of their conduct or individual merit, solely because they are
gay.58
The fury over gays in the military indicates the intolerance that
exists against gays and lesbians in American society. It also shows how
much of this intolerance is premised on unfounded prejudice rather
than fact. Bigotry is not born in a vacuum, instead it develops out of
hatred and misinformation.
Despite opposition, American lesbians and gays have had some
success and have slowly acquired political power. Many cities and
eight states now have laws that protect lesbians and gay men from
discrimination. 59 Distinct from the Netherlands, however, there has
never been an attempt to nationalize anti-discrimination rights that
would protect lesbians and gays.
One explanation as to why the Netherlands is ahead of the United
States with regard to its national protection of homosexuals is the
openness of its communication networks. Unlike the United States,
where the media is privately-owned and reflects capital interests, the
Dutch communication system is government run. One would suppose
that the government might restrict information, but the opposite has
shown to be true. All interest groups, ranging from the religious right
to the humanist league, broadcast their own programs. The result is
that the Dutch can view and listen to a variety of opinions including
those of lesbians and gays. Hence, homosexuals are given the
58. "According to the General Accounting Office, chasing suspected homosexuals out of
military service costs the Pentagon about $27 million annually. That estimate ... does not
reflect the human cost of ruined careers, disrupted lives and widespread fears of gay bashing."
Tom Morganthau, Gays in the Military, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 1993, at 52, 54.
59. Eight states, over 100 municipalities, and many employers in the United States prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation. See LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND,
A NATIONAL SUMMARY OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). The states include California,
Connecticut, D.C., Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, NewJersey, Vermont, and Wisconsin. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 51.7 (West Supp. 1994); CONN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81a-r (West Supp. 1991); D.C.
CODE ANN § 1-2501, 2502, 2512 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (Supp.
1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A
(Law. Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(1-5,7,8,8a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West
1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 963 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1211 (Supp. 1993); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1302 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, § 2362 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2488 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (1993); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1726 (Supp. 1993); WiSc. STAT. ANN. § 16.765 (West 1986); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 21.35 (West
1986); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 66.395 (West 1990); WISc. STAT. ANN. § 66.432 (West 1990); Wisc.
STAT. ANN. § 101.22 (West 1988); WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 1988); WISc. STAT. ANN.
§ 230.18 (West 1987). Some of the municipalities which have enacted sexual-orientation based
discrimination laws include Berkley, Cal. ch. 13.29 et seq.; Denver, Colo. 28-91 et seq.; Atlanta,
Ga. City Charter (1973 Ga. Laws 2188); Chicago, Ill. ch. 199 et seq.; Baltimore, Md., Art. 4, § 9
(16), 12 (8); Boston, Mass., Title 12, Ch. 40; Minneapolis, Minn. Title 7, Chs. 139, 141; Austin,
Tex., ch. 7-4, arts. II, III, IV; Seattle, Wash., chs. 14.04 & 14.08, Ord. No. 111714; Milwaukee,
Wis., ch. 109-15.
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opportunity to dispel many of the myths and to correct misinforma-
don regarding homosexuals. American lesbians and gays do not have
the same media access and must even contend with networks owned
by religious conservatives which spew forth a barrage of attacks. °
Another salient factor might be the organizational structure of the
Dutch gay and lesbian groups. The "Dutch Organization for the
Integration of Homosexuality COC" (Cultuur-en-Ontspannings
Centrum) is a national organization with more than fifty6 ' affiliate
chapters.6" The United States has no counterpart.6 3 Furthermore,
the COC has always been willing to promote bonds with other groups
that have similar goals. In many instances, other groups in the
United States have been unwilling and even fearful of aligning with
lesbians and gays.' The fact that there was a specific anti-homosexu-
al national law that Dutch lesbians and gays could focus on meant
that there was cohesion. In the United States, it is rare that lesbians
and gays work together. Frequently, the two groups find more to
divide them than to unite them.65
Some commentators observe that a possible explanation of why the
Dutch are ahead in protecting lesbians and gays is due to increased
tolerance and a less religious society.6 6  It is noteworthy that a
consortium of Catholics, ConservativeJews and religious fundamental-
ists frequently lead the effort to forestall any American request for
60. ADAM, supra note 39, at 110, 179.
61. Tielman and Hammelburg, supra note 22 at 309.
62. The COG has 10,000 members. A. Mattijssen, M. Turksma & I. de Vries, Lesbian Life
in the Netherlands, in UNSPOKEN RULES, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS, (R.
Rosenbloom ed., 1994).
63. There is some attempt to network at a national level. The National Gay & Lesbian Task
Force ("NGTF") is the prime example. But, homosexuals primarily organize at local levels.
ENRIQUE RUEDA, THE HOMOSEXUAL NETWORK 153 (1982). It is estimated that there are 3,000
such local organizations. Id. There have been a few recent groups that have spawned
metropolitan counterparts such as Queer Nation and ACT-UP, but they did not appeal to
"assimilated" and "respectable" lesbians and gays. ADAM, supra note 39, at 161-64.
64. For instance, Betty Friedan, who was the national president of NOW, denounced
lesbians as a "lavender menace" in a 1970 newsletter. SeeADAM, supra note 39, at 97. Since that
time, NOW has progressed and created a National Task Force on Sexuality and Lesbianism.
ADAM, supra note 39, at 98.
65. ADAM, supra note 39, at 99 (observing that lesbians became frustrated working with gay
men who were occupied with their own issues and ignored problems that lesbians faced). "Many
lesbians suspected that gay men would be happy to accept the place befitting their sex and class
while leaving the system of male domination intact." ADAM, supra note 39, at 46. The advent
ofAIDS may have made gays and lesbians somewhat less divisive: "[1] esbian and gay groups took
responsibility for doing something about AIDS in the mid-1980's when the larger society was
either panicking or denying the threat..." ADAM, supra note 39, at 157.
66. ADAM, supra note 39, at 159-60; see also Hoogma, supra note 30, at 54-57 (noting that
Dutch Society has become secularized).
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equal rights for lesbians and gays.67 In the Netherlands, by contrast,
a third of the population exists which identifies itself as non-religious,
and is a political force that supports protection from speech which
harasses and promotes discrimination against homosexuals.'
III. PROPOSALS
The Dutch can offer the following lessons or "treats" for American
lesbians and gays. What is needed in the United States is more
speech when that speech leads to informed public opinion and
voting, and less speech when the speech promotes hatred and
discrimination. Harassing speech that victimizes gays and lesbians
could be legally challenged by revitalizing Supreme Court decisions
that pre-date RA. V Petitioner v. St. Pau 69 Further, a worthy Dutch
example lies in utilizing group defamation concepts, or extending
emotional distress claims buttressed by international law. These ideas
are all inherent in Van Zijl, even though the primary focus for the
Dutch decision was an equal protection argument.7"
A. Speech Lessons
Under Dutch law, Fred could recover damages. Both the Dutch
Constitution and Penal Code forbid discrimination against people
because of their sexual orientation.7 Under Dutch law, "anyone
who in public, orally or through writing or illustration, insults a group
of persons on account of their race, religion or belief or hetero- or
homosexual orientation," is subject to one year in prison and a
fine.72
67. ADnM, supra note 39, at 136 (stating as an example the incidence of one such religious
consortium which pursued a "lengthy court challenge to nullify the [New York City] mayor's
executive order barring discrimination against gay people....").
68. ADAM, supra note 39, at 136. (describing the Dutch political and religious sentiment
of many. In 1985, "Pope John Paul II met the most vocal public resistance to his antigay and
antifeminist pronouncements during his worldwide tours.").
69. 112 S. Ct 2538 (1992).
70. Van Zijl v. Goeree, 1990 RvdW, Nr. 41 (HR Neth).
71. PENAL CODE, art. 137, 137d, 137e, 137f (Neth) (Art. 1, Dutch Const.).
72. Id. However, in the United States, Goeree's words would not be protected per se.
Goeree's remarks are untrue and therefore, defamatory. The Constitution does not protect
defamation, Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 563 (1942), or obscenity, Roth v. United States, 345 U.S. 476 (1957).
These exceptions to First Amendment protection are, however, narrowly construed. Defamation
must be directed toward a particular individual. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 256-57. Fighting words
must "by their very utterance inflict injury," be addressed to one specific individual, and must
have a "direct tendency" to provoke immediate violence from the listener. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S.
at 571-72. Goeree's words would not qualify. Although the utterance arguably inflicted injury,
the words were not directed to Van ZiIl individually nor could they effectively incite immediate
violence.
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A law of this kind in the United States would presumably contradict
the First Amendment. In the United States; statutes may limit the use
of fighting words, but must also be content-neutral." In R.A.V
Petitioner v. St. Paul,74 the Supreme Court held as unconstitutional a
Minnesota statute that prohibited the public display of symbols, such
as swastikas and burning crosses, that provoked "anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender.. ."" on the ground that it prohibited hate-speech against
some groups and not others.76 Justice Scalia, writing for the majori-
ty, noted that under the St. Paul statute "one could hold up a sign
saying, for example, that all 'anti-Catholic bigots' are misbegotten; but
not that all 'papists' are, for that would insult and provoke violence
'on the basis of religion'."77 He stated that the St. Paul statute
effectively licensed "one side of a debate to fight free style, while
requiring the other to follow the Marquis of Queensbury Rules."78
In R.A.V, the majority lists numerous exceptions to the First
Amendment's protection of speech.7" Among these exceptions the
Court lists defamation, citing to Beauharnais v. Illinois." In Beau-
harnais, the Court upheld an Illinois statute prohibiting the dissemina-
tion or display of materials that "expose the citizens of any race, color,
creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is
productive of breach of the peace or riots.' It also held that
73. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
74. ILd.
75. The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MINN. STAT. §§ 292.02 (1990)
reads in full: "Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor."
76. R.A.V. Petitioner v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992).
77. Id. at 2548.
78. Id Marquis of Queensbury Rules refer to "a boxing code of fair play developed in 1869
by the eight Marquis of Queensbury." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 801 (New College ed. 1978).
79. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543 (listing various forms of unprotected speech, including
defamation, fighting words and obscenity).
80. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
81. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258. The Illinois statute section at issue, § 224a of Division 1
of the Illinois Criminal Code, reads in full: "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or
corporation to manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any
public place in this state any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which
publication or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class
of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication or exhibition exposes the
citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or oblequy or which is
productive of breach of the peace or riots." 38 ILL. Ray. STAT. § 471 (1949).
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individuals may be held liable for defamation of groups as well as
individuals. 2
The Court found that Beauharnais' dissemination of leaflets stating
that all black people were "rapists and robbers" was libelous and fell
outside the protection of the First Amendment. 3 The Court further
held that state regulation of libelous speech is justified by the state's
interest in public peace and the judgment that an individual's dignity
and participation in public life depends on the social standing of the
racial or religious group to which that person belongs.8 4
The RA.V Court's citation of Beauharnais is curious given the
similarity between the statutes at issue in each case. Both statutes
prohibit forms of expression that subject suspect classes to contempt
and derision. The narrow difference rests on the fact that the hate
speech at issue in RA. V is opinion and thus, its truth is of no
concern to the courts.85  In contrast, the speech at issue in Beau-
harnais which is declared as fact, is blatantly untrue.86 Technically,
a Minnesota statute could prohibit the publication of untruthful
propaganda against social, racial or religious groups that gives rise to
public ridicule or discrimination. 7 Such a law would satisfy the
content-neutral requirement of RA.V,' and would be constitutional-
ly acceptable under the Beauharnais analysis.89 Some might argue
that subsequent case law has eroded the strength of the Beauharnais
opinion. This erosion would be due, in large part, to the fact that the
Illinois statute in question in Beauharnais was designed to thwart
actions capable of inducing violence.
82. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258 (holding that:"...if an utterance directed at an individual
may be the object of criminal sanctions, we cannot deny State power to punish the same
utterance directed at a defimed group.. .
83. Id. at 266.
84. fd at 263.
85. R.AY. Petitioner v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2548-49 (1992).
86. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 265-66.
87. Accepting this analysis and conclusion that libel, as untrue propaganda, is not protected
under Beauharnais, one should arrive at the conclusion that Minnesota could prohibit the
publication of such propaganda as libel; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982)
(stating that the content of speech does to some extent effect whether it will be protected or
not under the First Amendment). "A libelous publication is not protected by the Constitution."
ILd.
88. 112 S. Ct. at 2545. "The government may not regulate use based on hostility-or
favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed."
89. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,265 (1952). "Illinois in common with many States
requires a showing not only that the utterance state the facts, but also that the publication be
made 'with good motives and for justifiable ends'."
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For example, in Collin v. Smith,"0 the Seventh Circuit struck down
a Village Ordinance in Skokie, Illinois that prohibited public
demonstrations that would "incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility
toward a person or group of persons by reason of reference to
religious, racial, ethnic, national or regional affiliation."'" The
statute was passed in order to stop a Nazi parade through Skokie, a
Jewish suburb of Chicago that was home to large numbers of
Holocaust survivors.92 The United States Supreme Court stayed a
state court injunction, holding that although a Nazi parade would
emotionally and mentally upset many Skokie residents, speech which
invites dispute and induces "a condition of unrest," and creates
"dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger is among the highest purposes of the First Amendment."93
However, the premise in Beauharnais that a person's social standing
contributes to their ability to participate in the political process, is
nonetheless, still valid. 4 Justice Frankfurter's observation still rings
true that a person's job, educational opportunities and "the dignity
accorded him may depend as much on the reputation of the racial
and religious group to which he ... belongs as on his own merits."95
This is true not only for racial and religious minorities, but also for
gays and lesbians. Homosexuals often lose theirjobs or are not hired
at all because of misguided perceptions and prejudice about them as
a group. 6 Many people are told, and believe, that homosexuals are
sex-starved degenerates who molest children as a matter of course.97
90. 578 F.2d 1197, 1199 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied439 U.S. 916 (1978). Village Ordinance
No. 77-5-N-994 requires marchers to obtain permits that contain certain content-based speech
prerequisites and require high-cost insurance policies.
91. Id.
92. Village Ordinance No. 77-5-N-995 (May 2, 1977). This ordinance prohibited "[t]he
dissemination of any materials within the Village of Skokie which promotes and incites hatred
against persons by reason of their race, national origin, or religion, and is intended to do so."
This ordinance, along with two others, was enacted specifically in response to attempts by the
National Socialist (Nazi) Party of America to demonstrate in Skokie.
93. National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). The opinion
in Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978), teamed with such Supreme Court opinions as Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) and Brandenburg v. Ohio, 394 U.S. 444 (1969), has lead noted
constitutional scholars to conclude that Beauharnais has been vitiated.
94. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952).
95. Id.
96. See National Gay Task Force, Employment Discrimination in New York City: A Survey of Gay
Men and Women, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 244-48 (William B. Rubenstein, ed. 1993)
(chronicling the work experiences and prejudices inflicted upon gays and lesbians in New York
city).
97. This incendiary attribute, wrongly linked to gays and lesbians, is subtly pervasive not
only throughout society broadly, but also runs insidiously as an undercurrent through many legal
cases involving homosexuals. See, e.g. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Baker v. Wade,
769 F.2d 289, n.9 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
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The result of these lies and misconceptions is that not only are
many gays and lesbians psychologically harmed, but they are often
relegated to a position of political and legal second-class citizen-
ship.9" In Bowers, the United States Supreme Court deemed gays and
lesbians guilty of a crime "more malignant than rape" and then ruled
they have no fundamental right to privacy under the Constitution.99
This holding is based solely on prejudice, however the consequence
is legal and social apartheid for gays and lesbians.
In the Netherlands, by contrast, people cannot be alienated from
the political process. This mandate is the foundation of the Hoge
Raad's opinion in Van ZijL1" In holding that Goeree's untruthful
article harmed the plaintiff by diminishing his position in society and,
consequently, violated his right to equal treatment, the Dutch opinion
parallels the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Beau-
harnais.101 Key to the Hoge Raad's reasoning is the fact that Goe-
ree's published remarks were untrue, just as the dishonesty of the
defendant's remarks was also key in the Beauharnais decision. 102
Therefore, instances where speech is untrue and clearly libelous
may trigger a valid contemporary application of Beauharnais. Despite
constitutional limitations on laws that prohibit speech likely to incite
violent reactions, as in Collin,"°3 that offend certain audiences, as in
Cohen, 1 4 or must be content neutral, as in RA.Y, °5 no case has
limited Beauharnais in instances where the speech at issue is blatantly
untrue. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that states may impose
their own standards of liability for defamatory speech against private
persons. 106
98. Denied the right to legal recognition of their relationships and protection against
discrimination, how else can gays and lesbians see their legal status in the United States?
Indeed, the main point of Evans v. Romer, involving a Colorado referendum to repeal any
existing anti-discrimination laws based on sexual orientation, is that the referendum effectively
shuts gays and lesbians out of the political process regarding issues of sexual orientation. See also
Smith, supra note 50 (explaining Colorado's anti-gay amendment and a historical basis of
discrimination against homosexuals in the United States).
99. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
100. Van ZIjl, 1990 RvdW NR.41 (HR Neth) (holding that freedoms, such as religious
propagation, while important rights, nonetheless are still bound by the responsibilities of each
individual before the law to respect others in exercising their freedoms).
101. id
102. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267 (1952). Indeed, the Court held that not only
were defendant's remarks untruthful, they were, in fact, put forth as if true and thus not "with
good motives and forjustifiable ends."
103. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 1978).
104. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
105. R.A.V. Petitioner v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545 (1992).
106. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (establishing that a publisher is liable
for defamatory statements that she knows are untrue, or reasonably should know are untrue);
see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985)
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Dutch law dramatically departs from its United States counterpart
in its inclusion of homosexuals into legally protected classes. Unlike
the current trend in United States First Amendment jurisprudence
which requires that statutory restrictions on speech be content
neutral, Dutch law officially recognizes that some groups require more
protection than others."' Giving these groups legal protection is
not considered giving them special rights, but rather affording them
the equal protection granted to people who have not been the
traditional targets of persecution. Dutch law recognizes the impor-
tance of free speech; that freedom, however, does not include the
freedom to harm others. 08
B. Group Defamation
A libelous statement such as "the consequence of homosexuality is
AIDS," certainly causes harm to the reputation of all homosexu-
als."° In most instances, American victims of such hate speech must
(declaring that in cases where the plaintiff is a private figure and the statement does not regard
a "public concern," the proof of actual malice, as required in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), is not necessary to be held liable for defamation).
107. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (explaining the expansion of anti-
discrimination legislation to specificallyprotect against persecution based on sexual orientation).
108. PENAL CODE, arts. 137c, 137d (Neth) (providing protection from both oral and written
invectives based on sexual orientation).
109. Other lies are frequently told about gays and lesbians. One is that by their proximity
or example, lesbians and gays convert heterosexual children into homosexuals. If this were so,
homosexual parents would have homosexual children. Susan Golombok, Ann Spencer &
Michael Rutter, Children in Lesbian and Single-Parent Households: Pychological and. Psychiatric
Appraisa 24J. CHILD PHYSCHOL. PSYCHIATRY 551,570-71 (1983) (finding in a study of children
in both homosexual and heterosexual households no atypical psychosexual development).
Studies have shown that single lesbian mothers are no more likely to affect the gender identity
of their children than heterosexual single mothers. Id. at 569. In fact, it was found that lesbian
mothers are more concerned about providing male role models than their heterosexual
counterparts. Id at 569-70. According to the studies, what really matters is if the mother had
a partner in the home. So, as with heterosexual families, children have better self-confidence,
self-acceptance and independence if the family has two emotionally available and supportive
adults. The sexual orientation of the parent has no effect on the sexual identity of their
children). Id. at 571. See Martha Kirkpatrick, Lesbian Mothers & Their Children: A Comparative
Study, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545, 550 (1981) (indicating that there are very little
differences in either the childrearing methods of gay or straight parents or the gender role
development or sexual orientation of children). Furthermore, new studies indicate that there
is no psychologically adverse effect from being raised by a homosexual parent. Daniel D.
Coleman, Gay Parents Called No Disadvantage, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1992, at B7, col. 4. See also
Smith, supra note 50, at fns. 10-11 and accompanying text (refuting the rhetoric of antigay
groups, who erroneously maintain that homosexuals are seeking "special rights." Smith also
outlines the various forms of discrimination gays and lesbians experience.). Akin to the
misbelief of homosexual contagion of heterosexual children is the belief that all gay men will
molest young male children. In fact, heterosexual men are more likely to sexually abuse
children. A. Nicholas Groth & H. Jean Birnbaum, Adult Sexual Orientation and Attraction to
Underage Persons, 7ARcHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 175,180 (1978) (finding that the vast majority
of child sex offenders are heterosexual men who are attracted to perceived "feminine" features
in young boys). Child abuse, child battering, sexual attacks and molestations most often are
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show that the untrue statement harms them personally."' The
Dutch are not saddled with the same incumbrance. The Hoge Raad,
for example, found that the pronouncements made by Goeree were
unscrupulous with respect to the plaintiff's interest despite the fact
that the reference made was about all homosexuals."' The Rever-
end Goeree, the Court held, has community obligations that include
not publishing incorrect statements about the connection between
homosexuality and AIDS." 2 Although it is true that gays comprise
a large portion of those with AIDS, the Court noted that such data
does not justify a claim that homosexuality inexorably leads to
AIDS. 3 The Court observed that it is a well-known fact that AIDS
can be transmitted by many vectors including heterosexual contact
and intravenous drug use, and furthermore, that homosexuals can
have sexual contact without being infected with AIDS." 4
The Court drew attention to the fact that the Goerees must have
known their statements were untrue when they wrote them and
distributed their journal and leaflets. 5 Even if they did not, the
Court said the Goerees had a responsibility to avail themselves of such
knowledge.116
The United States has a limited legal history concerning the
treatment of speech that uses defamatory language against large
groups of people. There is an assumption in American law that a
protected interest more easily accrues to an individual, and not a
group." 7 The right to live one's life with a maximum amount of
individual freedom is a popular concept in the United States.
American society enjoys individual freedom, however, at a cost to
committed by heterosexual men within a household. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education &
Welfare; National Center on Child Abuse & Neglect, Publ. No. (OHD) 75-30074, Child Abuse &
Neglect: The Problem and its Management 3 (1976) (noting that in the United States, 90% of all
sexual child abuse is committed by heterosexual males on minor females).
110. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (holding that a plaintiff
cannot recover under an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the statement
"could not reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [respondent]"), Old
Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284 (1974) (holding that words used in "a
loose, figurative sense" cannot support an action for defamation; instead, there must be
something more precise that embodies conveyance of false idea).
111. Van Zijl v. Goeree, 1990 RvdW Nr. 41 (HR Neth).
112. Id.
113. Id at 2 (affirming the findings of the lower court).
114. Id. at 7.
115. Van Zijl v. Goeree, 1990 RvdW Nr.41 (HR Neth).
116. Id.
117. David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libe 42 COLJM. L. REV. 727,
730-31 (1942) (writing that traditions of individualism are more powerful in the United States
than elsewhere. Consequently, our "thinking is still in terms of the 'individual' and the 'state,'
and our law of defamation, such as it is, is conceived of only as a protection against individual
injury.").
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protection for collective forces. There is an implicit assumption that
group membership is reflective of a collective interest, which has
minimal value and is consequently subordinated to individual
interests.""
As such, even though the lesbian and gay population is less than
ten percent," 9 it is unlikely that an American court would find
statements, such as those bandied around by the Reverend Goeree,
to be defamation. Further, public speech such as speech involving
the defamation of large groups, is more likely to involve the First
Amendment because the courts believe that the public has a right to
know.
20
Despite these restrictions, limited possibilities exist for individual
gays and lesbians to sue as members of a group. Although courts
maintain that size does not make the difference, they have discour-
aged large groups from bringing defamation suits.121  One of the
largest groups recognized by the courts was the sixty man football
squad at Oklahoma University. 22 The plaintiff, who was a player on
the team, had a cause of action when a newspaper untruthfully stated
the team used amphetamines. The court held that the entire
Oklahoma University team was exposed to public hatred and ridicule
and the exposure "tend[ed] to deprive the team and its membership
of public confidence.' 23  Since the plaintiff was well known and
identified as an Oklahoma University football player, the group libel
defamed him personally as well.'
24
In contrast, when a doctor of osteopathy in Oklahoma claimed
group libel, the court denied him recovery even though the defen-
dant publication said that osteopaths are trained in an inferior
manner and that osteopathy is unscientific." There were 19,686
osteopaths in the United States at that time and, according to the
118. Id.
119. SAMUEL S. JANUS & CYNTHIA L.JANus, THEJANUS REPORT ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 69-71
(1993) (stating that nine percent of men are gay, and five percent of women are lesbian).
120. Under these circumstances, the right to know seems arguable. "Not all speech is [of
equal] First amendment importance...." Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (stating that the First Amendment was enacted to protect speech
regarding matters of public concern rather than speech between private individuals).
121. Neiman Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (quoting from RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 564(c), "[w]here the group or class disparaged is a large one, absent circumstances
pointing to a particular plaintiff as the person defamed, no individual member of the group or
class has a cause of action.").
122. Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1962), appeal dismissedper cufiam,
376 U.S. 513 (1964).
123. Id. at 48.
124. Id. at 42.
125. McCullough v. Cities Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 833, 834 (Okla. 1984).
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court, the reference to the group did not affect the reputation of
every individual member. Unlike the Oklahoma University football
player, the individual osteopath had no cause of action. 128
As with Van Zijl American lesbians and gays should be mindful of
what exactly the courts are saying. If the claim is that gays cause
AIDS, then this in an untruthful statement, as the Dutch Supreme
Court clearly recognizes. 127 But when this lie is told in the United
States, it must be aimed at a more narrowly defined group in order
to be accepted by the courts. Thus, if a Reverend such as Goeree
claims that a specific AIDS task force is comprised of gays, and that
gays cause AIDS, then a defamation cause of action is more likely to
succeed. The circuitous route American lesbians and gays must take
in comparison to their Dutch counterparts pointedly illustrates how
difficult it is for victims to have any legal recourse against hate speech
in the American system, even when that hate speech is untruthful. 28
IV. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Defamation greatly jeopardizes the reputation of gays and lesbians,
but it also causes emotional harm. The emotional distress caused by
these lies is an important factor in the high rates of suicide, drug, and
alcohol abuse and general low self esteem in the gay community.129
In their equal protection analysis, the Dutch recognize that emotional
distress results from harassing speech and can consequently form a
basis for a legal claim.' The lower court in Van Zjl described the
hate messages delivered as religious speech beyond the boundary "of
reasonable propagation of religious belief . . . ."" The Reverend
Goeree could not cloak such speech as religious belief because the
lies "injuriously" distressed the homosexual community.l2 In the
United States, compensation for emotional distress resulting from
similar religious speech would be difficult to achieve.
Because emotional distress, like defamation, is a harm to one's
dignity, the American courts make stringent demands of proof for a
126. Id. at 837.
127. Van Zil v. Goeree, 1990 RvdW Nr.41 (HR Neth).
128. See Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987)
(making an analogy that AIDS is the "modem day equivalent of leprosy" in terms of the stigma
that attaches to those who have the disease or are in high-risk groups for its contraction).
129. Gay youths are two to three times more likely to attempt suicide in comparison to other
youths. According to a recent study, homosexual youths may comprise up to 30% of completed
youth suicides annually. Paul Gibson, Gay Male and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in REPORT OF
SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON YOUTH SUICIDE 3-110, 3-128 (1989).
130. Van ZijI v. Goeree, 1990 RvdW Nr.41 (HR Neth).
131. Van ZIjl v. Goeree, 1987 NJCM Nr.101 at 305 (Neth Court of Summary Proceedings).
132. Id.
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cause of action based on emotional distress. If Van Zijl had taken
place in the United States, Fred not only would have to be the subject
of Goeree's article, but he also would have to suffer severe emotional
distress in order to win a claim in most American courts. Indeed,
some courts would require that Fred manifest physical symptoms
resulting from the emotional distress. Hence, unless he develops a
rash, 133 tics, 134 or requires hospitalization, 3 ' Fred is unlikely to
have a successful claim.
Irrespective of how severely Fred experiences the emotional distress,
most Americans would consider Reverend Goeree's language
insufficiently outrageous to win a claim of emotional distress.
American courts have ruled against emotional distress claims made by
young African-American men who were called "knot-headed boy,"
"bastard," and "nigger" by their lawyer.'36 Likewise, the courts have
not granted emotional distress claims to women workers whose co-
workers call them "fat ass," "whore," and "cunt."
137
These are a few circumstances where American courts ruled in favor
of emotional distress claims. Hateful epithets spoken to patrons by
workers in businesses open to the public have yielded limited results
for plaintiffs. For example, a black father and his son won an
133. See, ag., LaBrew v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
(connecting the plaintiffs development of a rash with the outrageous conduct of the
defendants, which caused the plaintiff's emotional distress).
134. See, eg., Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 584 (Ariz. 1987) (stating that plaintiff
developed "high blood pressure, a nervous tic in her left eye, chest pains, [and] rapid
breathing," which substantiated her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
135. See, e.g., Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Cal. 1972) (explaining that
the harsh emotional distress with which the defendants burdened the plaintiff caused her to be
hospitalized).
136. Bradshaw v. Swaggerty, 563 P.2d 511, 512 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (ruling that such
offenses were insufficiently outrageous in a case of emotional distress); seeDawson v. Zayre Dep't
Stores, 499 A.2d 648, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (suing a department store for emotional distress
because a clerk called the plaintiff a "nigger"); Lay v. Roux Lab., Inc., 379 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (calling plaintiff a "nigger" was not sufficiently outrageous to state a claim);
Irving v.J.L. Marsh, Inc., 360 N.E.2d 983, 984-86 (Il. App. Ct. 1977) (denying a claim where a
clerk inscribed the epithet, "arrogant nigger," on the return form presented to the plaintiff
because it did not possess "the degree of severity that is necessary to establish a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress").
See also Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust & Co., 152 A.D.2d 169, 181 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)
(ruling that ethnic slurs such as "Hebe" and "Kike" do not rise to the level of outrageous
conduct necessary to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Logan v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 466 So. 2d 121, 123 (Ala. 1985) (holding there was no action for an admitted
homosexual where store employee said he was "as queer as a three-dollar bill"); Dominguez v.
Stone, 638 P.2d. 423, 425-26 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that where the plaintiff overheard
the defendant call her a "Mexican" in a derogatory way, it was insufficient to state a cause of
action).
137. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 624 (6th Cir. 1986) The dissent claimed
however, that such derogatory words create a hostile work environment, and therefore violate
Title VII.
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emotional distress claim against a waitress because she responded to
the father's question regarding his order by saying, 'You can't talk to
me like that, you black son-of-a-bitch. I will kill you."'38 She also
repeatedly shouted on her way back to the kitchen that "they [were]
nothing but a bunch of niggers."139
Emotional distress claims are also marginally effective in employ-
ment situations when a superior uses hateful epithets against an
employee or when the speaker knows that the listener is particularly
susceptible." If the listener has a heart condition or is mentally ill,
for example, and the speaker knows this, chances of recovering for
emotional distress are greatly improved.141 Unfortunately, none of
this would help Fred if he filed suit in the United States, as he is not
physically or mentally ill. Goeree is not his employer; nor were
Goeree's attacks made in a place of public accommodation. In
addition, Goeree's words were couched in religious language and
would therefore receive the highest First Amendment protection. 42
There are those who offer new approaches that, if accepted, would
increase a person's chance of recovery for emotional distress and
approximate what happened in the Netherlands. For instance, it has
been suggested that anti-discrimination legislation could serve as a
basis for a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 43  For anyone protected by legislation, discriminatory
138. Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 F. Supp. 206, 208 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
139. Id. at 211. Relief was denied to the wife and parents, however, even though they too
witnessed the harassing speech. Furthermore, the judge reduced the jury award from $25,000
to $2,500 to ensure ethnic groups would not form lines to collect "balm." Id.
140. Robinson v. Hewlett Packard Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1115 (Ct. App. 1986)
(finding a sufficient triable issue where supervisor stated that "she did not like blacks," "that
black people in general don't like to work," "they try to get something for nothing," and that
because plaintiffwas black "he did not want to work and was faking his illness"); Gomez v. Hug,
645 P.2d 916, 917 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that a Mexican-American county employee,
called "fucking spic," "a fucking Mexican greaser," and "a pile ofshit" by a County Commission-
er had a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Aganval v.Johnson, 603
P.2d 58, 63 (Cal. 1979) (holding that "you black nigger" and other racial epithets are sufficient
to support a verdict for intentional infliction of emotional distress where one element in
determining whether behavior is outrageous is if the defendant knows the plaintiff is susceptible
to injury through mental distress); Alcom v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 217 (Cal. 1970)
(upholding complaint of intentional infliction of emotional distress where supervisor shouted
"you goddamn niggers", "I don't want any 'niggers' working for me" and "I'm getting rid of all
the 'niggers"').
141. Anderson v. Prease, 445 A.2d 612, 613 (D.D.C. 1982) (finding extreme and outrageous
conduct where defendant-doctor who knew that plaintiff-patient was "peculiarly susceptible to
emotional distress," cursed and screamed at the patient).
142. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 762 P.2d 46
(Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989) (holding that claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress are barred by the First Amendment to the extent that they are based on
protected religious speech).
143. SeeJean C. Love, Discriminating Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 123, 149-50 (1990) (suggesting that courts adopt "a rebuttable
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speech would be rebuttably presumed to be outrageous.'" Utilizing
a rebuttable presumption would enhance a plaintiffs chance of
recovery because she would not have to prove that the language was
inappropriate. 4 5  Instead, it would be the defendant's burden to
show that his discriminatory words are worthy of protection.
46
Unfortunately, such a proposal will not help Fred. Except in the
few states and cities where civil rights protection have been extended
to lesbians and gays, Fred would not be able to use a rebuttable
presumption of outrageousness. 147 The suggestion, however, does
offer a methodology that gays and lesbians could attempt to use. Gays
and lesbians have characteristics in common with others who fall into
the protected categories."
The harm that befalls lesbians and gays who suffer insulting, hateful
language is similar to that suffered by members of other protected
groups. Words like "dyke" and "fag" are serious transgressions of the
principle of moral worth and dignity. Such words derogate a
characteristic central to one's self-image. 49 The slurs imply that
gays and lesbians are not worthy of respect and have a lesser claim to
civil liberties than other citizens do. Thus, there should exist a tort
for insults which would encompass insults against homosexuals similar
to insults against other "outsiders."15
presumption that all categories of discriminatory speech meet the extreme and outrageous
conduct requirement").
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 59 (referring to states and municipalities which ban discrimination based
on sexual orientation).
148. SeeJantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd and remanded, 976 F.2d
623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993) (comparing characteristics of race,
gender, alienage, and illegitimacy with sexual orientation).
149. Id. at 1548 (stating that discrimination against immutable characteristics such as
homosexuality will cause "significant damage to the individual's sense of self").
150. SeeElizabeth F. Defeis, Freedom of Speech and International Norms: A Response to Hate Speech,
29 STAN.J. INT'L L. 57 (1992) (examining how American courts have responded to the issue of
hate speech and how in the context of international human rights conventions, the United
States differs from other democratic nations. In international law, rights are interdependent,
not absolute, and in the hate speech context, freedom of speech should not override the right
to equality.); Richard Delgado, Words that Wound A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 146 n.72 (1982) (referring to M. DEUTSH, I. KATZ
& A. JENSEN, SOCIAL CLASS, RACE AND PSYCHOLOGIcAL DEVELOPMENT 175 (1968)); Mari J.
Matsuda, Public Responses to Racist Speech: Considering the Wictim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320
(1989) (advocating the prosecution of racist speech through formal criminal or administrative
procedures and seeking to give hate speech victims not only a voice, but a means to redress their
grievances); Mayo Morgan, Talking About Hate Speech; A Rhetorical Analysis of American and
Canadian Approaches to the Rgulation of Hate Speech, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1425 (1994) (arguing that
the unofficial narrative dismantles the concept that free speech is a battle between the speaker
and government suppression. Further, the unofficial narrative describes how hate speech affects
the listener. The courts need to integrate the unofficial narrative of the victim's voice into their
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Similar to arguments regarding race or religion, discrimination
against lesbians and gays is invidious and unjustifiable. It is invidious
because sexual orientation is immutable and, even if not immutable,
is a trait which bears no relationship to the ability of a homosexual to
work, to participate in society, or to seize opportunities available to
others.'' As a class, homosexuals have historically suffered discrimi-
nation. 5 2  Homosexuals in the United States have historically been
subjected to discrimination both pervasive in its scope and intense in
its impact 15 3 Because of this vilification, lesbians and gays hide
opinions on free speech and look at how hate speech, in terms of its discriminatory context,
causes harm). Comparatively, Morgan looks at how the Canadian Supreme Court, with support
from international treaties, human rights doctrines, and with similar constitutional standards,
upheld the regulation of hate speech. Morgan, supra, at 1497.
See also John Charles Hayes, Note, The Tradition of Preudice Versus the Prindple of Equality:
Homosexuals and Heightened EqualProtection Scrutiny AfterBowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. REV. 375,
377 (1990) (noting that "the risks attendant to identification as a homosexual are so severe and
pervasive that homosexuals are often forced to hide their identities"). Homosexuals not only
hide their homosexuality, but also, politically, they are unable to prevent discrimination or
counter popular, unsupported stereotypes about homosexuals. Hayes, supra, at 378. The
stereotypes regarding homosexuals frequently involve, and especially for men, the idea of
preying on youth, or being sissy. Hayes, supra, at 384. Notably, the hatred of lesbians and gays
is centered on the fact that homosexuals seem to defy the 'assigned' gender roles. Hayes, supra,
at 384. Further, homosexuals traditionally have dealt with society's hatred by pretending they
were straight. Hayes, supra, at 395, n.102. Moreover, pretending has allowed some lesbians and
gays to make their way in the economic sphere, but at tremendous psychological costs. Hayes,
supra, at 395.
See generally Harris M. Miller II, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL L. REV. 797, 821-24 (1984)
(explaining how stereotypes, such as the belief that homosexuals will convert a heterosexual
child to homosexuality, the belief that homosexuals are more likely to molest children, and the
belief that homosexuality is a mental disease, disadvantage gays);John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech
in Context: The Case of Verbal Threats, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 653, 699-713 (1994) (advocating the
creation of a new tort remedy to deal with special incidents of hate speech that would consider
whether the slur was a means of communicating a threat); Kim M. Watterson, Note, The Power
of Words: The Power of Advocacy Challenging the Power of Hate Speech, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 955
(1991) (emphasizing the need to more effectively advocate against hate speech by re-framing
hate speech to show the victim's perspective. The victim's rights are too often lost and the
perpetrator's rights are gloriously asserted. Hate speech is not an exercise of a fundamental
right, but an assertion of power in the context of discrimination.).
151. SeeJantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1548 (finding that based on the overwhelming weight of
currently available scientific information, homosexual or heterosexual orientation is generally
not subject to conscious change) (quotingResolution of the American Psychological Association,
Jan. 1985) "Homosexual orientation 'implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability
or general social or vocational capabilities'". Id.
152. See Miller, supra note 150, at 824-25 (stating that private discrimination against gays has
ranged from housing and employment discrimination to violence); see, e.g., Symposium,
Developments in the Law - Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1575 (1989)
[hereinafter Symposium] (stating that homosexuals face discrimination in military employment,
employment that requires a security clearance, and civil service employment. Furthermore, the
lack of legal protection for gay men and lesbians in the private employment sector remains,
despite the fact that nearly one-third of gay men and nearly one-quarter of lesbians surveyed,
reported that they have been discriminated against in the work force.).
153. Symposium, supra note 152, at 1549.
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their sexual orientation and, as a result, become politically power-
less."'54 This being so, homosexuals should be able to claim a
rebuttable presumption of emotional distress in the same manner as
other protected classes. Similar to what happens in the Netherlands,
dignitary harm resulting from hatred should be a valid basis for tort
recovery for those individuals traditionally singled out for society's
opprobrium.
V. RIGHTS BASED ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
As a general principle, Americans view the Bill of Rights as a
human rights model, superior to United Nation conventions,
protocols or similar international treaties of North and South
America.55  In most instances, there is jurisprudential reluctance to
use international principles when it relates to human rights. 56  To
do so would imply that the Bill of Rights is underinclusive. However,
when the United States finds that a treaty can be used to its advan-
tage, it does so without hesitation. For instance, the United States felt
free to call upon the human rights doctrines in the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights when informing
Iran that it had an obligation to observe human rights under those
treaties with respect to American hostages.
157
154. SeeJantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991) (stating that homosexuals
face severe limitations on their ability to protect their interests by means of the political
process). Because of harsh societal penalties, many homosexual persons conceal their sexual
orientation which effectively guarantees that homosexuals are politically silenced. Id. Refraining
from open political activity diminishes any perspective or sensitivity by the heterosexual majority
for concerns of the homosexual community. Id.
155. See Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM.J. INT'L L.
851, 853-60 (1989) (noting that although the United States has contributed to the development
of international human rights law, it has failed to ratify or adopt international human rights
treaties).
156. See generaUy United States v. Machain, 502 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1992) (holding that while
a forcible abduction by United States officials of a Mexican national alleged to have murdered
a United States DEA agent may offend general principles of international law, such abduction
is not in violation of a Mexico-United States Extradition Treaty where said treaty does not
explicitly prohibit such kidnappings).
157. United States v. Iran, 1980 I.CJ. 3, 5-9. In this suit against Iran, the United States
claimed that the failure to provide protection for United States nationals during the hostage
taking at the embassy was a violation of fundamental rights. See Barbara D. Budros, Comment,
The Former American Hostages'Human Rights Claims Against Iran: Can They Be Waived?, 4 HouS.
J. INT'L L. 101, 112 (1981):
The existence of such fundamental rights for all human beings gives rise to a
corresponding duty on the part of every State to respect and observe them as reflected
in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, regional conventions and other
instruments defining basic human rights....
332 JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW [Vol. 4:303
Other countries are not so cavalier with respect to human rights as
defined by international treaties."' Certainly the courts in Van Zijl
relied on international treaties in their decision.159 Argued by
scholars and impacted groups, treaties set a standard by which
individual nation states must abide."6  The intensity of this force
cannot be ignored-even by our own legal system. Thus, advocates
for the rights of lesbians and gays should present American courts
with references to how countries like the Netherlands use internation-
al treaties to extend fundamental civil rights to homosexuals. 61
This suggestion is made with full recognition that, unlike the
158. SeeVan Zijl v. Goeree, 1990 RvdW Nr.41 (HR Neth) (referring to The Treaty of Rome,
Nov. 4, 1950 and The Treaty of New York, Dec. 16, 1966).
159. I& at 6, 9.
160. See David Catania, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Sodomy Laws, 31 AM.
CRM. L. REV. 289, 291 (1994) (constructing, with international law as the foundation, a Federal
Common Law framework to overturn sodomy laws in the United States); Defeis, supra note 150,
at 74-75 (discussing numerous examples of international treaties that provide guidelines for the
prohibitions of hate speech); see also Markus Dirk Dubber, Note, Homosexual Privacy Rights Before
the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights: A Comparison of
Methodologies, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 189, 191-99 (1990) (presenting a comparative analysis of
Bowers v. Hardwick, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, and Norris v. Ireland as all three cases share similar
fact patterns and faced similar court battles. In analyzing the differences in outcomes, the
author found that the European Court of Human Rights was willing to take a much moredynamic view of homosexuality in present day culture. Id. at 210. Conversely, the U.S. Supreme
Court placed homosexuality in a static, retrospective world-view. Id. A key factor in the
European Court's decisions was their reliance on an explicit right to privacy which does not existin the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 201-02.); Laurence R. Heifer, Lesbian and Gay Rights as Human
Rights: Strategies for a UnitedEurop, 32 VA.J. INT'L L. 157 (1991) (examining the impact of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom on
European Law Reforms concerhiing the proposals and strategies that will benefit gay and lesbian
Europeans); Brenda Sue Thornton, The New InternationalJursprudence of the Right to Privacy: A
Head on Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB. L. REV. 725 (1995) (noting that the U.S.
position on gay rights is in direct conflict with international law. The Human Rights Committee
ruling in Toonen v. Australia reflects the willingness of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights to fully recognize gay rights as human rights. Id. at 757-65. The author explains
the mechanisms that brought the Toonen case before the committee and how this might apply
to an American case. Id. at 765-73.); James D. Vilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual
Orientation, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1994) (discussing how international law
can be used in many areas to provide a higher standard of protection than is afforded under
national law); Mark E. Wojcik, Using International Human Rights Law to Advance Queer Rights. A
Case Study for the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 55 OHIO ST. LJ. 649 (1994)(discussing how the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man offers international
recognition of gay rights and that it should be used to further validate state and federal
constitutional arguments).
161. See generally Evert van der Veen & Astrid Mattijssen, Lesbian and Gay Rights in Europe:
Homosexuality and the Law, in THE THIRD PINK BOOK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF LESBIAN AND GAY
LIBERATION AND OPPRESSION 225-46 (Aart Hendriks, Rob Tielman, & Evert van der Veen eds.,
1993) (noting that these treaties have given the Dutch courts a new position of power with
respect to extending rights to gays and lesbians). In the Netherlands, the Dutch courts do not
have the power to declare an Act of Parliament null and void on the grounds that it conflicts
with the Dutch Constitution. Thejudiciary, however, can declare an Act of Parliament null and
void on the grounds that the act conflicts with provisions of a ratified treaty, insofar as the treaty
is binding on all persons. Thus, international treaties on human rights are especially important
for establishing rights for Dutch lesbians and gays. Id.
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Netherlands, the United States has signed no treaties which give an
individual standing to claim rights against a state, the federal
government, or an individual.162 Regardless, international human
rights treaties have a moral authority which our own courts should
respect and follow.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Dutch experience provides a legal model that may be used in
an innovative way to decrease hate speech aimed at lesbians and gays
in the United States. In the Netherlands, published lies, such as "gays
cause AIDS," are subject to legal action. In addition, Dutch homosex-
ual groups are aided by a constitutional provision and a criminal code
which the highest Dutch court interprets as preventing speech that
prejudices homosexuals. Hence, the Netherlands offer an example
that American lesbians and gays can use. Even though the recent
United States Supreme Court decision on hate speech 163 creates an
uphill battle, gay and lesbian communities may lobby for a statute that
authorizes a civil defamation and emotional distress suit for lies told
to cause prejudice against a group. Moreover, as recognized by the
courts and lawmakers in the Netherlands, support for these proposi-
tions can be found in international treaties.
All of these ideas present challenges that will meet stormy opposi-
tion in the United States. There is a long history of giving deference
to speech rights even when speech promotes discrimination. The
verbal terrorism that is created by lies, however, is not deserving of
protection, and strides can be made to correct the balance between
speech and non-discrimination principles.
162. Such a reference might include the Van Ziji decision in which the Dutch Supreme
Court held, pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("ECHR") and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),
that restrictions on the right to religious freedom are permissible where such restrictions are in
place to protect "against insulting, unnecessarily distressing and discrimination-encouraging
comments...." Van Zijl v. Goeree, 1990 RvdW Nr.41 (HR Neth). Article 9(2) of the ECHR
guarantees freedom of religion, but allows for limitations of this freedom in order to protect
public safety, order, health, morality, or to protect the rights and freedom of others. ECHR,
supra, note 12. Similarly, Article 18(c) of the ICCPR guarantees freedom of religion, but those
freedoms are not absolute. There too, limitations can be prescribed by laws which are necessary
to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. ICCPR, openedfor signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
163. R.A.V. Petitioner v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).

